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ON THE VALUE OF STOCHASTIC DIFFERENTIAL GAMES
WENDELL H. FLEMING AND DANIEL HERNÁNDEZ–HERNÁNDEZ*
Abstract. We consider a two player, zero sum stochastic differential game
based on a formulation given by Fleming and Souganidis. The saddle point
property is introduced, and it is proved that the unique uniformly continuous
bounded viscosity solution of the upper Isaacs PDE with boundary condition
satisfies such a property. Also, it is shown that approximately optimal Markov
strategies can be constructed for both players.
1. Introduction
In this paper we consider two-player, zero sum stochastic differential games on a
finite time horizon. Our formulation of the stochastic differential game is the same
as in Fleming-Souganidis [8]. However, we consider a different point of view, which
is based on a saddle point property and approximately optimal control strategies
for the maximizing and minimizing players. We do not assume that the Isaacs
minimax condition holds. Hence, both upper and lower values of the stochastic
differential game must be considered.
In Section 2, we recall from [8] the Elliott-Kalton definition of upper and lower
game value functions V+(t, x) and V−(t, x). They are viscosity sense solutions to
the upper and lower Isaacs PDE’s with boundary condition at the final time T .
See [8, Theorem 2.6], also [11],[12]. Throughout the paper, we will consider the
upper differential game. Corresponding results for the lower game are obtained by
replacing the payoff J by −J . At an intuitive level, the maximizing player has an
”instantaneous information advantage”, which is described formally at the end of
Section 2 in terms of Markov control policies.
For deterministic differential games, the viscosity solution property of the up-
per value function V+ can be obtained in a straightforward way from a dynamic
programming principle. See [4], also [9, Sections 11.5, 11.6]. For stochastic dif-
ferential games technical problems related to measurability issues are encountered
with this approach. See [8, p.299] . To avoid these difficulties, another indirect
argument was used in [8]. It made use of a somewhat artificial subclass of Elliott-
Kalton strategies, called r-strategies. In the present paper, we will characterize
the upper value function by different methods, which do not involve r-strategies
or a continuous time dynamic programming principle.
Received 2010-6-16; Communicated by Hui-Hsiung Kuo.
2000 Mathematics Subject Classification. Primary 91A05, 91A15; Secondary 91A25.
Key words and phrases. Stochastic differential games, Isaacs equation, Elliott-Kalton strate-
gies, saddle point property, approximately Markov strategies.
* This research was partially supported by Concayt under Grant 61423.
341
           Serials Publications 
                 www.serialspublications.com 
Communications on Stochastic Analysis 
Vol. 5, No. 2 (2011) 341-351
342 WENDELL H. FLEMING AND DANIEL HERNÁNDEZ-HERNÁNDEZ
In the Elliott-Kalton definition of upper value, the minimizing player chooses a
control u and the maximizing player chooses a strategy β. The asymmetric roles
of the minimizing and maximizing players in this definition has sometimes been
criticized within the game theory community. In Section 3 we consider a different
formulation in which both players choose strategies. However, in the upper game
the strategies α chosen by the minimizer must be restricted to some subclass of
Elliott-Kalton strategies. We choose the subclass of strictly progressive strategies,
as in Definition 3.1. We then seek pairs of admissible strategies αε, βε which are
approximately optimal according to Definition 3.2 of the saddle point property.
Theorem 3.4 states that αε, βε can be chosen as approximately Markov strategies,
in the sense of Definition 3.3.
The definition of approximately optimal Markov strategy was suggested by a
formalism for describing optimal control policies mentioned at the end of Section
2. It uses partitions π of the time interval [t, T ] on which the stochastic differential
game is played. For the minimizer, the control us on each subinterval [tj , tj+1] of π
depends on the state at the left endpoint tj . For the maximizer, the control zs on
[tj , tj+1] depends on both the state at time tj and on the minimizer choice of us.
In Section 4 we review a construction from [8, Section 2] which leads to approxi-
mately Markov policies for the minimizer with the required saddle point property.
A different construction is needed in Section 5 to find corresponding approximately
Markov policies for the maximizer. Similar constructions were used by Świech [15,
Section 2] to obtain sub and super optimality principles corresponding to smooth
sub and super solutions to Isaacs PDE’s. Sections 4 and 5 provide discrete time
approximations V π(t, x) and Wπ(t, x) to the unique bounded, uniformly contin-
uous viscosity solution v(t, x) to the upper Isaacs PDE with boundary condition,
as the mesh size of the partition π tends to 0. This convergence result is proved
by a method due to Souganidis [13] [14]. Lemma 5.1 and Corollary 5.3 show that
Wπ(t, x) satisfies a uniform Lipschitz condition in x and uniform Holder condition
in t. The corresponding result for V π(t, x) [8, Lemma 2.4] is easily obtained by
standard methods, which cannot be used for Wπ(t, x).
The results in Sections 4 and 5 lead easily in Section 6 to a proof of the main
Theorem 3.4. In particular, they show that v(t, x) = V+(t, x), where V+ is the
Elliott-Kalton upper value function.
A quite different approach to stochastic differential games and viscosity solu-
tions to Isaacs PDE’s was taken in Buckdahn-Li [3]. It uses the theory of backward
SDEs. An interesting connection between certain ”tug-of-war” stochastic differ-
ential games and the infinity Laplace equation was considered in Atar-Budhiraja
[1] and Barron-Evans-Jensen [2].
2. Stochastic Differential Games
Given T > 0 a finite time horizon and t ∈ [0, T ), let (Ωt,F ,Pt) be the canonical
probability space, defined as
Ωt = {ω ∈ C([t, T ];Rk) : ωt = 0}, (2.1)
the σ-algebra F is the family of Borel sets completed with respect to the Wiener
measure Pt and the underlying filtration Fs, t ≤ s ≤ T , is generated by the
ON THE VALUE OF STOCHASTIC DIFFERENTIAL GAMES 343
Brownian paths; see [10]. The stochastic game will be formulated in this space.
Let Wt be a Brownian motion defined as the coordinate map in this filtered space
taking values in Rk, and us and zs stochastic processes taking values in some
compact subsets U and Z of Rm1 and Rm2 , respectively. Consider a stochastic




s , us, zs)ds+ σ(s,X
t,x
s , us, zs)dWs, 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T, (2.2)
with initial condition Xt,xt = x ∈ Rd.
We make the following assumptions on the coefficients. The function f : [0, T ]×
Rd × U × Z → Rd and the d × k matrix σ : [0, T ] × Rd × U × Z → Md,k are
bounded, continuous, and Lipschitz continuous with respect to t, x uniformly for
(u, z) ∈ U × Z.
The payoff is defined as
J(t, x;u, z) = E
{∫ T
t





with L : [0, T ] × Rd × U × Z → R being bounded, continuous, and Lipschitz
continuous with respect to t, x uniformly for (u, z) ∈ U × Z and g : Rd → R
being bounded and Lipschitz continuous. The player 1 controlling us is trying to
minimize J , while player 2 is trying to maximize J controlling zs.
Given 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T we define an admissible control process u : [t, s]×Ωt → U
(respectively z : [t, s] × Ωt → Z) for player I (resp. player II) on [t, s] as an Fr
progressively measurable process taking values in U (resp. Z), for r ∈ [t, s]. The
set of admissible controls for player I (resp. II) is denoted by U(t, s) (resp. Z(t, s)).
For every u ∈ U(t, s) and z ∈ Z(t, s), there is a pathwise unique strong solution to
the SDE (2.2) with given initial data. We identify the control processes which are
equal for almost all ω and almost everywhere in the interval [t, s]; the elements of
the same equivalent class are identified as u ≈ ũ and z ≈ z̃, respectively. When
s = T , notation is simplified writing U(t) and Z(t).
Definition 2.1. An Elliott-Kalton strategy for the maximizing player II is a map-
ping β from U(t) into Z(t) such that if u ≈ ũ on [t, s], then β(u) ≈ β(ũ) on [t, s]
for every s ∈ [t, T ]. The set of these strategies is denoted as ∆EK(t). The set
of Elliott-Kalton strategies α : Z(t) → U(t) for the minimizing player I can be
defined in a similar way, and is denoted by ΓEK(t).
Given the initial conditions (t, x), the upper and lower value of the stochastic
differential game (SDG) are defined by




J(t, x;u, β(u)) (2.4)
and




J(t, x;α(z), z). (2.5)
Formally, each of the above values of the game has associated an Isaacs PDE.
For the upper value it has the form
vt +H
+(D2v,Dv, x, t) = 0, v(T, x) = g(x), (2.6)
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with Dv, D2v the gradient and matrix of second order partial derivatives of v(t, ·),




F (A, p, x, t;u, z), (2.7)





a(t, x, u, z)A) + f(t, x, u, z) · p+ L(t, x, u, z)
]
(2.8)
and a = σ · σ′. The lower Isaacs PDE is similar, replacing the second term on the
left side of (2.7) by maxz∈Z minu∈U F (A, p, x, t;u, z).









F (A, p, x, t;u, z)
holds, it is said that the Isaacs minimax condition holds, and it can be verified
that in that case V+(t, x) = V−(t, x).
Throughout we shall consider the upper value of the SDG, but analogous results
can be obtained for the lower value. In this case, the maximizing player has the
information advantage. To illustrate this situation the class of Markov control
policies for the players can be considered. A control policy for the minimizing
player is a function u : [0, T ]×Rd → U while a Markov policy for the maximizing
player is a function z : [0, T ] × Rd × U → Z. When u is Lipschitz continuous
there exists a strong solution to the SDE (2.2) for each control z ∈ Z(t) of the
maximizing player; similarly, when z is Lipschitz continuous, for each admissible
control u ∈ U(t) of the minimizing player a strong solution exists for (2.2).
Formally, from the Isaacs equation (2.6) it is possible to define a control policy
for each player u∗, z∗ such that:




F (D2V+, DV+, x, t;u, z),
and
z∗(t, x, u) ∈ argmax
z∈Z
F (D2V+, DV+, x, t;u, z),
which would satisfy a saddle point property. Here D2V+, DV+ are evaluated at
(t, x). In general the argument above cannot be made rigorous. However, it
was the main motivation to study the existence of approximately Markov control
strategies which are nearly optimal in the sense to be explained in Section 3.
3. Control Strategies, Saddle Point Property
In Definition 2.1 the Elliott-Kalton strategies were introduced, as well as the
definition of upper and lower value functions. According to this definition, for the
lower value the minimizing controller has advantage in the information available
at each time s. Now we shall reduce the class of admissible strategies for this
player to the smaller class ΓS(t), which eliminates this advantage. The definition
of ΓS(t) is essentially the same as the one in [9, p.392] for deterministic differential
games.
Definition 3.1. A strategy α ∈ ΓEK(t) for the minimizing player is strictly pro-
gressively measurable if for each strategy β ∈ ∆EK(t) of the maximizing player
the equation
u = α(z) z = β(u)
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has a solution û, ẑ. The set of strictly progressively measurable strategies is
denoted by ΓS(t).
The same argument as in [9, p.393] easily shows that




J(t, x;α(z), z). (3.1)
If the infimum on the r.h.s. is taken over ΓEK(t) instead of ΓS(t), then it gives
the lower value V−(t, x), which can be strictly less than V+(t, x) when the Isaacs
minimax condition does not hold.
Motivated by the definition of upper value in (2.4) and inequality (3.1), we
introduce the
Definition 3.2. The saddle point property for the upper game is said to hold if
there exists a real valued function V (t, x) such that for each ε > 0 and (t, x) ∈
[0, T ]× Rd there exist αε ∈ ΓS(t), βε ∈ ∆EK(t) such that
(i) V (t, x)− ε ≤ infu∈U(t) J(t, x;u, βε(u))
(ii) supz∈Z(t) J(t, x;αε(z), z) ≤ V (t, x) + ε.
Definition 3.3. (a) α ∈ ΓEK(t) is an approximately Markov strategy for the
minimizing player if there exists a partition π = {0 = t0 < t1 < · · · <
tN = T} of [0, T ] with t = ti and Borel measurable functions ζj : Rd → U ,
for j = i, i+ 1, . . . , N − 1, such that
α(z)s = ζj(X
t,x
tj ), tj ≤ s < tj+1.
(b) β ∈ ∆EK(t) is an approximately Markov strategy for the maximizing player
if there exists such a partition π and Borel measurable functions ηj :
Rd × U → Z such that
β(u)s = ηj(X
t,x
tj , us), tj ≤ s < tj+1.
(c) For such a partition π, define the class of strategies α ∈ Γπ(t) ⊂ ΓEK(t)
such that α(z)s is constant on each interval [tj , tj+1).
By solving the SDE (2.2) on successive intervals [tj , tj+1], it can be seen using
an induction argument that Γπ(t) ⊂ ΓS(t). For deterministic games the complete
argument is presented in [9, p.392], while for the stochastic case an analogous argu-
ment can be used. Moreover, if α is an approximately Markov strategy constructed
as in part (a), then α ∈ Γπ(t).
The main result of the paper is the following theorem, the proof of which is
delayed until Section 6 after some technical preliminaries in Sections 4 and 5.
Theorem 3.4. The saddle point property holds with V = V+ = v, where v(t, x)
is the unique bounded, uniformly continuous viscosity solution to the upper Isaacs
PDE with boundary condition (2.6). Moreover, αε, βε can be chosen as approxi-
mately Markov control strategies.
Remark 3.5. Our methods rely on time discretizations. It would be interesting to
find an approach to the saddle point property for which time discretizations are
avoided and the class ΓS(t) is replaced by some other class Γ̃(t) of strategies for the
minimizer. For the deterministic differential games considered in [7], Γ̃(t) is the
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class of Elliott-Kalton strategies α such that α(z) is a right continuous function
on [t, T ] with left limits at each s ∈ [t, T ]. See [7, Section 3].
4. Piecewise Constant Minimizing Controls
In this section we shall review some results from [8, Section 2] which will be
needed. Let π = {0 = t0, t1, . . . , tN = T} be a partition of [0, T ] and let ‖π‖ =
maxj(tj+1− tj). For t < τ define the operator G1 on the set C0,1b (Rd) of bounded,
Lipschitz continuous functions on Rd by









L(s,Xt,xs , u, zs)ds
}
for 0 ≤ t ≤ τ ≤ T . Here Xs corresponds to the solution of (2.2) when the first
player chooses the constant control us = u and the second player chooses control
z ∈ Z(t, τ). This operator maps the set C0,1b (Rd) into itself. The operators G1(t, τ)
are the same as in [8, formula (2.1)] with infsup replacing supinf.
On the other hand, define recursively backward in time
V π(t, x) =
{
g(x), t = T∏N−1
j=i G1(tj , tj+1)g(x), if t = ti < T.
(4.1)
Then, for j = i, . . . , N − 1,















with Vπ(T, x) = g(x).
Given a time t, consider partitions π such that ti = t for some i. Let
Uπ(t) = {u ∈ U(t) | us = utj , for s ∈ [tj , tj+1), j = i, · · · , N − 1}.
It was proved in [8, Proposition 2.3] that




J(t, x;u, β(u)). (4.3)
The proof of this proposition also gives αε ∈ Γπ such that
sup
z∈Z(t)
J(t, x;αε(z), z) ≤ V π(t, x) + ε/2. (4.4)
Moreover, αε is of the form required for an approximately Markov strategy, namely,
αε(z)(s) = ζεj(X
t,x
tj ), tj ≤ s < tj+1,
with ζεj Borel measurable; see formula (2.10) of [8].
From [8, Proposition 2.5], V π → v uniformly on compact sets as ‖π‖ → 0,
where v(t, x) is the unique bounded, uniformly continuous viscosity solution to
the upper Isaacs PDE with boundary condition g. Since Uπ(t) ⊂ U(t), (4.3)
implies that V+ ≤ V π. Hence, V+ ≤ v; in fact, V+ = v. This is a consequence of
Theorem 3.4 and also of [8, Theorem 2.6].
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Remark 4.1. The same proof of [8, Proposition 2.3] gives βε ∈ ∆EK(t) such that
V π(t, x)− ε/2 ≤ inf
u∈Uπ(t)
J(t, x;u, βε(u)).
However, this is not good enough for our purposes. In Section 6, we will find a
corresponding inequality in which infu∈Uπ(t) in the above display is replaced by
infu∈U(t), and V
π is replaced by Wπ defined in Section 5.
5. Another Discrete Time Approximation
On the same partition π = {0 = t0 < t1 < · · · < tN = T} define Wπ(tj , x) by
backward induction on j, as follows
Wπ(T, x) = g(x), (5.1)












L(s,Xtj ,xs , us, h(us))ds
}
,
with H := {h : U → Z | h is Borel measureable}.
Lemma 5.1. If ‖π‖ is small enough, there exists M such that for all x, x′ ∈ Rd,
|Wπ(tj , x)−Wπ(tj , x′)| ≤ M‖x− x′‖. (5.2)
Proof. To slightly simplify the argument, additionally to the assumptions already
made on the coefficients of the SDE (2.2), assume that f and σ are also C1 in
the variables t, x. The same Lipschitz bound as in (5.2) then holds under the
assumptions on f, σ in Section 2, by making smooth approximations to f, σ with






the solutions to (2.2) on [tj , tj+1], and define ηs := X
tj ,x
s − X̃tj ,x
′













s , us, zs)ds, and X
λ
s = (1 −
λ)X
tj ,x
s − λX̃tj ,x
′
s . Using the Ito’s differential rule,
d‖ηs‖2 = 2ηs · dηs + ‖Bsηs‖2ds,





E‖ηs‖2 ≤ ‖x− x′‖2(1 + C(s− tj)eC(s−tj))
≤ ‖x− x′‖2(1 + C1(s− tj)),
for ‖π‖ small enough. Since (1+a) 12 ≤ 1+ 12a for a > 0, Cauchy-Schwartz implies
that
E‖ηs‖ = E‖Xtj ,xs − X̃tj ,x
′




for tj ≤ s ≤ tj+1.
Now, take u ∈ U(tj , tj+1) and h ∈ H, and let zs := h(us). Using backward
induction on j, let ΛN be the Lipschitz constant for the function g in (5.1). If Λj+1
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is a Lipschitz constant for Wπ(tj+1, ·) and K1 a Lipschitz constant for L(s, ·, u, z),
we get from (5.1) and (5.3) that
|Wπ(tj , x′)−Wπ(tj , x)| ≤
[










For ‖π‖ small enough this implies the Lipschitz property ofWπ(tj , ·), with constant
Λj = Λj+1(1 +
C1
2 (tj+1 − tj)) + 2K1(tj+1 − tj), which yields a uniform bound
|Λj | ≤ M . 
Lemma 5.2. Given t = ti, x ∈ Rd and ε > 0, there exist uε ∈ U(t) and βε ∈
∆EK(t) with the following properties.
(i) βε(u)(s) = ηεj(X
t,x
tj , us), tj ≤ s < tj+1, where ηεj : R
d × U → Z is Borel
























L(s,Xt,xs , (uε)s, βε(uε)s)ds
}
≤ Wπ(t, x) + ε/2.
Proof. Given δ > 0, to be specified later, choose a partition of Rd into Borel sets
{A1, A2, . . .} of diameter less than δ and choose yk ∈ Ak. Replacing x by yk in
(5.1), given γ = γ(ε) > 0 take hjk ∈ H such that










L(s,Xtj ,yks , us, hjk(us))ds
]
(5.5)
≤ Wπ(tj , yk)
Now, for s ∈ [tj , tj+1), define βε(u)s := ηεj(Xt,xtj , us), with ηεj(x, u) =
∑
k hjk(u) ·
IAk(x). Thus, βε is defined successively on intervals [tj , tj+1).
Let K = 1 + C12 ‖π‖, with C1 the constant on the right side of (5.3) and recall
that K1 denotes the Lipschitz constant of L(t, ·, u, z). For j = i and x ∈ Ak, using
Lemma 5.1 and (5.5),






















L(s,Xt,xs , us, βε(us))ds
}
+M1δ +γ, (5.6)
where M1 = 2M + ‖π‖KK1.
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If (5.6) holds for j with constant on the right side equal to j(δM1+γ), in order
to verify it for j + 1 we need to take some conditional expectations and introduce
more notation. Given j ∈ {i+ 1, i+ 2, . . . , N − 1}, each ω ∈ Ωt is identified with
the pair (ω1j , ω2j), with ω1j = ω|[t,tj ] and ω2j = (ω− ω1j)|[tj ,T ]. Also, the Wiener
space is identified as the product space (Ωt,Pt) = (Ωt,tj × Ωtj ,P1j × P2j).



























s , us(ω1, ω2), βε(u)s(ω1, ω2))ds
]}
(5.7)
The term within the square brackets is not less that Wπ(tj , X
t,x
tj (ω1))− γ − δM1,
by (5.6), and using the induction hypothesis, it follows that the left side of (5.7)




left side of part (ii) is obtained. The right side of part (ii) follows directly from
(5.7) and using again an induction argument.
Given γ > 0 and s ∈ [tj , tj+1), if Xtj = x ∈ Ak, from part (ii) we can choose








L(s,Xtj ,xs , uεs, βε(uε)s)ds
}
≤ Wπ(tj , x) + γ.
This defines recursively uε on each interval [tj , tj+1). Proceeding by induction in
j, from (5.7) with u = uε, part (iii) is obtained taking γ =
ε
2N . 
Corollary 5.3. For t = ti, τ = tj,
|Wπ(t, x)−Wπ(τ, x)| ≤ K(τ − t) 12 , (5.8)
for some constant K.
Proof. Take uε and βε as in Lemma 5.2 and let X
t,x
s the solution of (2.2), with
Xt = x, u = uε and z = βε(uε). Then,
|Wπ(t, x)−Wπ(τ, x)| ≤ ‖L‖(τ − t) + E|Wπ(τ,Xt,xτ )−Wπ(τ, x)|+ ε
≤ ‖L‖(τ − t) +ME|Xt,xτ − x|+ ε
≤ K(τ − t) 12 + ε,
with ε > 0 arbitrary. In the last inequality we have used the estimate E|Xt,xτ −x| ≤
K1|τ − t|+K2(τ − t)
1
2 , with K1 = ‖f‖ and K2 = ‖σ‖. 
Now, for t < τ , define an operator G2(t, τ) on the set C
0,1
b (Rd) by









L(s,Xt,xs , us, h(us))ds
}
.
Notice that in Section 4 the operator G1(t, τ) was defined similarly.
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Lemma 5.4. Given ϕ ∈ C2b (Rd) let H+(D2ϕ,Dϕ, x, t;u, z), with H+ as in (2.7)





[G2(t, t+ δ)ϕ(x)− ϕ(x)]−H+(D2ϕ,Dϕ, x, t)‖ = 0,
where ‖ · ‖ is the sup norm.
The proof is similar to that for the corresponding result with G1 instead of G2.









F (A, p, x, t;u, h(u)).




g(x), t = T∏N−1
j=i G2(tj , tj+1)g(x), if t = ti < T.
If G2 is replaced by G1, then we get the corresponding expression (4.1) for V
π(t, x).
Theorem 5.5. lim‖π‖→0 W
π(t, x) = v(t, x), uniformly on compact sets, where v
is the unique bounded, uniformly continuous viscosity solution to the upper Isaacs
PDE (2.6).
Theorem 5.5 can be proved in the same way as for Proposition 2.5 in [8], using
Lemmas 5.1, 5.4 and Corollary 5.3; see also [9, p.393]. The method is due to
Souganidis [13] [14]. Observe that the strategy βε obtained in part (ii) of Lemma
5.2 has the approximately Markov property.
Remark 5.6. By using a method of Barles and Perthame, the uniform Lipschitz
and Holder estimates for Wπ in Lemma 5.1 and Corollary 5.3 could have been
avoided. However, with the Barles-Perthame method discontinuous viscosity sub
and super solutions must be considered. See [9, Section 9.5]. In the proof of a
comparison principle for discontinuous viscosity sub and super solutions, the fact
that a bounded, uniformly continuous viscosity solution v(t, x) exists to the upper
Isaacs PDE with boundary condition is used. See [9, Section 7.8] for fist order
PDEs.
6. Proof of the Main Result
As already mentioned in Section 4, V+ ≤ v, where v(t, x) is the unique bounded,
uniformly continuous solution to the upper Issacs PDE with boundary condition
g at time T . In (ii) of Lemma 5.2, let ti = t, j = N, tj = T . Then,




v(t, x)− ε ≤ inf
u∈U(t)
J(t, x;u, βε(u)). (6.1)
Since the right side is not greater that V+(t, x) and ε is arbitrary, v(t, x) = V+(t, x),
and hence part (i) of Definition 3.2 is satisfied.
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Part (ii) of Definition 3.2 requires strictly progressive αε. From (4.4) we know
that there exists such a strategy with
sup
z∈Z(t)
J(t, x;αε(z), z) ≤ V π(t, x) + ε/2,
and also that V π(t, x) tends uniformly on compact sets to v(t, x) as ‖π‖ → 0.
Taking π small enough we get part (ii) of the saddle point property. Moreover, αε
and βε are approximately Markov strategies.
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